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BOOK REVIEW
This Week on the Talk Shows: The Litigation
Explosion
J. ALEXANDER TANFORD*
THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED
THE LAWSUIT. By Walter K. Olson. New York: Truman Talley
Books-Dutton, 1991. 388 pp. $24.95.
For years, legal scholars have carried on an interesting debate within
the academy: Is there really a litigation explosion? How should we mea-
sure the volume of litigation? If there is a problem with over-litigation,
how do we fix it?' Although some of this debate has spilled over into the
popular press,' there is a need for a comprehensive summary of the
problems written for the general public.
When I was asked to review Walter K. Olson's book, The Litigation
Explosion, I agreed, hoping that this book would fill the void. Unfortu-
nately, it proved to be a disappointment. His book is based on many alle-
gations but little evidence, many half-truths but little context. His treat-
ment of the alleged litigation explosion is far too one-sided. It fails to give
* J. Alexander Tanford, Professor of Law and Ira C. Batman Faculty Fellow at Indiana
University School of Law, Bloomington, is the author of THE TRIAL PROCESS: LAW. TACTICS
AND ETHICS (1983), as well as a dozen articles on trial procedure. Thomas Stewart provided
valuable research assistance for this Book Review.
1. See P.S. Atiyah, Tort Law and the Alternatives: Some Anglo-American Compari-
sons, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1002 (1987); Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in
Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1990); Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of
Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly
Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983); Bayless Manning,
Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 Nw. U. L. REV. 767 (1977); Michael J. Saks, If There
Be a Crisis, How Shall We Know It? 46 MD. L. REV. 63 (1986); David M. Trubek et al., The
Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REv. 72 (1983).
2. See, e.g., Jack Anderson, U.S. Has Become a Nation of Lawsuits, WASH. POST, Jan.
25, 1985, at B8; Thomas Ehrlich, Legal Pollution, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Feb. 8, 1976, at 17;
Hold Down Awards to Ease the Crisis, USA TODAY, June 6, 1986, at 12A; David F. Pike,
Why Everybody Is Suing Everybody, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 4, 1978, at 50.
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the general public a balanced picture and instead reduces the discussion
to the level of talk shows.
Ols'on takes a complicated modern social issue, and reduces it to a
conspiracy among plaintiffs, personal injury lawyers, and liberal judges,
ganging up on poor, defenseless doctors and businesses. Olson's rhetorical
technique is a familiar one: Label something (Communism, political cor-
rectness, the legal profession) as an evil menace, blame society's problems
on it, and accuse one's opponents of being in league with evil. This
penchant for extremism provides few insights for those seeking to under-
stand the problems of the legal system and likewise adds little meaningful
dialogue to the current debate.
Walter K. Olson's writing suggests that he holds strong biases. He
appears to be very conservative, strongly pro-business, and vehemently
pro-defendant and anti-plaintiff.
His conservative credentials are impressive. Olson is a senior fellow
at the Manhattan Institute. He writes for Barron's, Fortune, The Wall
Street Journal, and The National Review. He participates in the Feder-
alist Society.3
Olson's pro-business bias is apparent from the book itself. He argues
that "[c]reative litigation . . . is dragging American business defendants
into [ruin]."'4 For example, in his fourth chapter, he criticizes long-arm
jurisdiction because it hurts businesses.
The business world felt the first effects. Courts quickly seized juris-
diction over enterprises that had never entered a state but did ship goods
regularly into it . . . The most profound impact was not on the really
big companies, . . but on the typical small to mid-sized firm that serves
a nationwide market from a single location. Suddenly these companies
found themselves defending suits in Skowhegan and Winnemucca, Kis-
simmee and Juneau. It mattered not how tiny a share of overall business
they had done in a state: an Illinois company was made to go to the U.S.
Virgin Islands to be sued though only $1,800 of its $35 million in annual
sales came from that territory."
Olson thinks it is outrageous to compel a business to defend in states
where it conducted business and injured people. He never even mentions
the people who were hurt, and how they are supposed to seek
compensation.
Olson is also staunchly pro-defense. He constantly takes the side of
defendants, however guilty, evil, immoral or culpable they may be, and he
constantly criticizes plaintiffs, however innocent and grievously hurt. He
3. These conclusions are based on a search for his name through NEXIS.
4. WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UN-
LEASHED THE LAWSUIT 307-08 (1991).
5. Id. at 77.
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criticizes long-arm jurisdiction by arguing that defendants have an abso-
lute right to appear in their home court, while plaintiffs have no right to
ever be in their home court. 6 He applauds a Massachusetts law that "pro-
tected doctors and hospitals from lawsuits in cases arising from less than
gross negligence, ' apparently unconcerned that such a rule means that a
doctor could negligently maim or kill a patient who could not get com-
pensation. He suggests that we start using a public prosecutor approach
in civil cases, in which we deprive plaintiffs of partisan lawyers but, of
course, allow defendants to keep theirs.8 He wants to raise the burden of
proof,9 which will result in more defense verdicts regardless of the merits.
In two instances in which doctors were sued for malpractice, Olson re-
ports that the defendants did not think they had been negligent, as if this
demonstrated that they were not in fact negligent."0
Throughout the book, Olson criticizes every case in which a defend-
ant has to pay damages, however culpable the defendant, however justi-
fied the damage award. For example, he criticizes a case in which a retail
film processor lost a customer's lifetime of filmed memories through its
own gross incompetence and had to pay $7,500 damages despite a dis-
claimer printed on the receipt stating that it was not liable." Olson ar-
gues that "freedom 'of contract" means that a business should have the
right simply to tell people they are not liable and that should settle it. 2
Olson's most obvious bias, however, is that he hates lawyers. He sees
lawyers as the bane of modern civilization. It is time, he asserts, "to make
America's litigators accountable for the hurts they do to those [defend-
ants] who are drawn involuntarily into their power."' 3 The major thesis of
his book seems to be that if we could only get rid of all the lawyers, then
the (white male elite) businessmen could get back to the business of run-
ning this country properly.
Of course, blaming lawyers for society's problems is not a new idea."
However, never before have I seen it done with such deliberately inflam-
6. Id. at 70-73.
7. Id. at 178.
8. Id. at 272-80.
9. Id. at 345-46.
10. Id. at 15-16 (criticizing a suit for malpractice in part because the defendant doctor
"thought he had [not] done anything wrong"); id. at 271-72 (stating that a case was "troub-
ling" simply because the defendant doctor concluded she had done the right thing although
an expert testified that failure to medicate or hospitalize a depressed patient who later at-
tempted suicide constituted malpractice).
11. Id. at 197-98.
12. See id. at 198.
13. Id. at 11.
14. "The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SEC-
OND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 4, sc. 2, at 131 (Norman Sanders, ed., Penguin
Books 1981) (n.d.).
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matory language. Olson accuses lawyers of appealing to emotion instead
of facts when they argue to the jury1 5 -a hypocritical allegation from a
person who writes like this:
The unleashing of litigation in its full fury has done cruel, grave harm
and little lasting good. It has helped sunder some of the most sensitive
and profound relationships of human life: between the parents who have
nurtured a child; between the healing profession and those whose life
[sic] and well-being are entrusted to their care. . . . It seizes on former
love and intimacy as raw materials to be transmuted into hatred and
estrangement. 6
Older lawmakers and judges tended to recognize litigation as a wasteful
thing,. . . grossly invasive of privacy and destructive of reputation....
It corrupted its participants by tempting them to harass each other and
to twist, stretch, and hide facts. It was a playground for bullies, an une-
ven battlefield where the trusting, scrupulous, and plainspoken were no
match for the brassy, ruthless, and glib.'7
What is striking and ominous is that the techniques perfected in per-
sonal injury lawsuits are fast being rolled out to a hundred other areas of
courtroom combat. Inflated damage claims and speculative legal theories,
scorched-earth procedural tactics and calculated appeals to emotion over
reason, contingency fees and client solicitation-all are being successfully
adapted to [other kinds of cases by] . . . [1]awyers who got their start
advertising on late-night television .... "
Contingency-fee law has made more overnight millionaires than just
about any business one could name ...
These men (very few are women) seldom seem to favor sober, under-
stated ways of spending their newfound wealth. One has turned lawsuits
against doctors into a villa in the south of France and a $2 million Paris
apartment. A list of their known holdings is spangled with the ranches,
jets, and very fancy cars that befit tycoons riding a cash wave with no
end in sight.'
America is the litigious society it is because American lawyers wield such
unparalleled powers of imposition. No other country gives a private
[plaintiff's] lawyer such a free hand to select a victim, tie him up in court
on undefined charges, force him to hire lawyers of his own at dire ex-
pense, trash his privacy through we-have-ways-of-making-you-talk dis-
covery, wear him down on the perpetual-motions treadmill, libel him
grossly in documents that become permanent public records, and keep
15. OLSON, supra note 4, at 7.
16. Id. at 2.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 7.
19. Id. at 45-46.
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him scrambling to respond to Gyro Gearloose experts and Game of the
States conflicts theories. 0
Olson's distorted account of the operation of the tort system also is
full of "Willie Horton" anecdotes:
The doctor at a large Long Island hospital was still shaking his head
in disbelief. He had just been sued over the delivery of a baby more than
twenty years earlier. . . . Like many obstetrics lawsuits, this one charged
that bad handling of the delivery had caused a birth defect. And like
many long-delayed suits it was going to be tough to defend, not because
the doctor thought he had done anything wrong, but because the facts
would be hard to reconstruct after so long. All he had done was assist at
the delivery; the doctor who had actually delivered the baby had died
years ago. But as usual the lawyers had sued every doctor in the file.
2
'
Judith Haimes, being treated for a brain tumor, underwent a CAT
scan at Temple University Hospital in Philadelphia. She sued the hospi-
tal and Dr. Judith Hart, a neuroradiologist, claiming she had suffered an
allergic reaction to a dye used in the scan. It felt "as if my head was
going to explode," she said.
Pain and suffering were only part of the claim. Formerly Ms. Haimes
had conducted seances at which such eminences as the poet Milton had
spoken through her. Now she said the dye had interfered with the
psychic powers that had enabled her to divine persons' past and future
[sic]. She could no longer make a living at this trade.
Judge Leon Katz ordered the jury to disregard the psychic-damage
claims, but after 45 minutes of deliberation it came back with an award
of $986,000."
In 1975 a troubled young woman tried to commit suicide by jumping
off the roof of her Chicago apartment building. She survived but was
hideously injured. Under the tutelage of a flamboyant trial lawyer, she
proceeded to sue her former psychiatrist, Dr. Sara Charles ....
"My first feelings after being charged with medical malpractice were
of being utterly alone," Dr. Charles wrote ...
For the four years that the case dragged on, "it swallowed up my
own life completely, demanded constant attention and study, multiplied
tension and strain, generated a pattern of broken sleep and anxiety" by
its challenge to "my integrity as a person and as a physician." . . . [One
of the plaintiff's expert witnesses] reviewed her records, and then opined
that it had been a mistake not to have ordered her drugged and hospital-
ized at early signs of trouble. Aghast at the thought that her judgment
might somehow have been wrong after all, Dr. Charles went back and
20. Id. at 299.
21. Id. at 15-16.
22. Id. at 152 (paragraph breaks omitted). The damage award was declared excessive by
the judge, and a new trial ordered. Id. at 152-53.
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plunged into the relevant professional literature in great detail, but after
long reading concluded that it fully backed up what she had done ....
She vowed to her husband: "If I am found guilty of malpractice over this,
I will never practice medicine again."23
Because of all the vituperative rhetoric, it is difficult to discern Ol-
son's specific complaints about the legal system. It is initially unclear
whether he is criticizing just the tort system or the entire legal system.
His focus is mostly on personal injury and medical malpractice cases, al-
though he occasionally discusses family law,2 4 with a few digressions into
commercial 5 and criminal" litigation.
His list of specific grievances is long. I will try to summarize it, but
probably cannot do it justice:
Olson claims that in the good old days, everyone knew that lawsuits
were evil."' Even "old time lawyers" knew that lawsuits were evil, so they
prohibited themselves from advertising or stirring up litigation. 8 Such
unseemly behavior was so obviously reprehensible and morally bad2" that
lawyers helped society keep lawsuits to a minimum. Life was good in
those days because we discouraged plaintiffs from bringing lawsuits. Law-
yers charged by the hour,30 champerty was punished,"' formal pleadings
(easily demurred) were required, 2 and the defendant was always given
the home court advantage."3
Plaintiffs in Olson's bygone era were good neighbors who preferred to
lose their cases rather than "fire off every arrow in [their] quiver of legal
rights," forgoing causes of action and eschewing discovery that could lead
23. Id. at 271-72.
24. See, e.g., id. at 181 (child custody and divorce cases in the conflict-of-law context).
25. See, e.g., id. at 7-8 (floodgates argument about horrors of personal injury system
"metastasizing" to commercial litigation).
26. See, e.g., id. at 15 (using quotation about a criminal lawyer to illustrate a chapter
on tort litigation).
27. Id. at 2-3. See also id. at 5 (stating that the erosion of the concept "culminated in1977 with a five-to-four decision by the U.S. Supreme Court officially endorsing the newidea that a lawsuit was no longer to be considered an evil").
28. See id. at 27 (quoting Blackstone (1765) for the proposition that advertising is med-
dling in others' affairs).
29. Id. at 2-3, 39-40.
30. Id. at 39 (quoting nineteenth-century preacher George Sharswood for the view that
contingent fees are evil because they expose a person to temptation).
31. Id. at 41-42.
32. Id. at 93-94. (citing an English judge in 1723 for the premise that formal pleadings
are more "fair to the opponent" in addition to an 1859 case that overturned a judgmentbecause plaintiff rounded the amount of a promissory note down to the next lower whole
dollar).
33. Id. at 70-73 (citing a case from 1874).
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to ill will.3 4 As a reward, the "bitterest marital fallings-out [could] end in
a miraculous reconciliation," a "new management might take over at the
workplace where you were fired and offer you a job instead of a back-pay
settlement," and the magazine that had libelled you "might print your
side of the story."3"
Olson asserts that the harmonious balance of this innocent, peaceful
era was shattered by changes in laws and legal institutions. First, we in-
vented long-arm jurisdiction that required defendants to answer to
charges of tortious conduct in the state where the injury occurred. 36 Sec-
ond, we shifted from formal to notice pleading that made it easier for
injured plaintiffs to seek compensation, but made it difficult for defend-
ants to find out why they were being sued..7 Third, we invented discov-
ery, which is an invasion of privacy 8 and a big financial burden; deposi-
tions often involve thousands of written pages, twenty days, and multiple
lawyers. 9 Fourth, we changed the rules of professional ethics to permit
lawyers to advertise, educate people about their right to sue, and other-
wise drum up business. ° Fifth, the law changed from cut-and-dried rules
to vague principles, so no one knew what their rights were any more."'
And sixth, the law schools changed from teaching that lawsuits were evil
to supporting the use of lawsuits to assert rights and gain a day in court
for the common person."
As a result of these changes in the law, Olson argues, there has been
a litigation explosion. He asserts that the number of lawsuits has dramat-
ically increased recently,43 that Americans are more litigious today than
ever before,'4 and that they are "the world's most litigious people."' 5 He
specifically mentions explosive increases in contingent fee tort cases, child
custody, constitutional, and general civil cases.4'6 This deregulation of the
legal business has somehow changed lawyers into evil people who charge
contingency fees, cheat, stir up litigation, sabotage their own clients' in-
34. Id. at 41.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 70-73.
37. Id. at 89-91, 105-07.
38. Id. at 109-13.
39. Id. at 115-16.
40. Id. at 3, 30.
41. Id. at 133-43.
42. Id. at 4-5.
43. Id. at 5, 87.
44. Id. at 151.
45. Id. at flyleaf.
46. Id. at 39, 132-33, 147-48.
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terests,7 go after "deep pockets" rather than impoverished defendants,48
and keep most of the money for themselves' 9
Olson then argues that the litigation explosion has had serious social
costs. First, he repeats the insurance industry's claim that the litigation
explosion has caused liability insurance rates to skyrocket. Specifically, he
alleges that payouts for malpractice suits against doctors and hospitals in
New York have increased 30,000% in a generation, that New York City's
payouts for lawsuits went from $24 million to $114 million between 1977
and 1985, and that hairdressers, veterinarians, charity volunteers, social
workers, clergy, and judges who "may. . . be sued. . . for handing down
wrongful decisions" all now regularly buy liability insuranceY' Second, he
asserts that Americans now spend too much time and money fighting
each other in court."1 Third, he thinks we now have too many lawyers
with too much power and earning too much money. 2 Fourth, he blames
litigation, rather than the underlying acts that give rise to it, for breaking
up relationships between husband and wife, doctor and patient, manage-
ment and labor, and business and customer." Fifth, he believes that
"[h]onest, careful, competent people" who are completely innocent of the
accusations "now get sued in huge numbers, and lose with some
frequency."' "
In the end, however, Olson is hard pressed to come up with specific
proposals for changing the litigation system. He suggests replacing con-
tingent fees with hourly rates paid for by the losing party,55 a cap on
punitive damages, 56 and the vigorous enforcement of Rule 11 sanctions, 7
but none of these proposals is new. He proposes a return to formal,
bright-line legal rules that will give citizens notice of what their rights
are, arguing that simple, formal rules lie well within our reach in most
areas of law." But mostly he just criticizes all alternatives-government
payments or social insurance, alternative dispute resolution, and no-fault
insurance."
47. Id. at 34-35, 39-40.
48. Id. at 69-70.
49. Id. at 10 (stating that clients receive as little as 15% of the damage awards).
50. Id. at 6-8.
51. Id. at 1.
52. Id. at 1, 9, 45-46.
53. Id. at 2. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
54. Id. at 9.
55. Id. at 35-39.
56. Id. at 313-14.
57. Id. at 323-29.
58. Id. at 148-49. He can be forgiven for his naivety about the law because he is not alawyer. Perhaps he should have taken his own advice when he asserts that we should only
listen to those experts who have actual experience in the field, id. at 314.
59. Id. at 299-312.
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The problem with Olson's argument is that much of what he says is
not true, is taken out of context, or is not representative of the ordinary
lawsuit.
His central claim is that America is too litigious. This assertion has
two factual premises: (1) We are the most litigious people in the world,
and (2) There has been a recent dramatic increase in the amount of litiga-
tion. Neither is correct.
According to statistics compiled by Marc Galanter, the United States
is not the most litigious country. Although Galanter points out that dif-
ferences in reporting methods make accurate country-to-country compari-
sons impossible, he estimates that Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Yugo-
slavia and parts of East Africa all have higher rates of civil litigation per
capita. Denmark, England, Sweden and France have similar litigation
rates.60 These data are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1
Estimated Litigation Rates for Selected Countries
Estimated Number of Civil
Country Cases Per Thousand Population
Yugoslavia 227.27
Tanzania (Arusha district) 100.00
Australia 62.06
New Zealand 52.32
Canada 46.58
United States 44.00
England/Wales 41.10
Denmark 41.04
Sweden 35.00
France 30.67
Nor is there any evidence that we are in the midst of a litigation
explosion. Galanter examined litigation rates in the United States back to
colonial times, and found that the modern era is hardly the most litigious
in our history." In colonial times, the litigation rate was up to six times
as high as it is now. In the first half of the 19th century, the rate was
twice what it is now. Since 1920, the rate has held relatively steady. These
data are summarized in Table 2.
The major differences in civil cases in this century concern the types
of cases being filed, not the numbers: domestic relations, tort cases, and
60. Galanter, supra note 1, at 52-62.
61. Id. at 37-52.
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cases filed in federal court have increased, while commercial, contract,
and property cases have declined.2
Nor is there any evidence of a recent boom in litigation rates. Data
from the National Center for State Courts shows that after correcting for
population increases, overall litigation rates rose only 4% from 1978-84, a
far cry from any notion of an "explosion."3 Most of that increase is ac-
counted for in small claims actions, which do not usually involve lawyers.
Olson singles out several kinds of cases as special objects of his
wrath. Two of the leading offenders are the personal injury tort case and
the class action suit. He calls the contingent-fee personal injury case the
"Big Rock Candy Mountain of today's American law." 6' He attacks the
class action suit,"5 and states that after Eisen v. Carlisle & Jaquelins6 in
1974, class action suits "began to burgeon." 61 Again, neither allegation is
true. According to statistics on actual court filings, tort cases filed in state
courts rose only 1% between 1978 and 1984 when the figure is adjusted
for the increase in population. Class action suits filed in federal district
courts declined 67.7% between 1975 and 1984.60
The book is riddled with factual inaccuracies of all kinds. Olson
claims that "only around 15 percent of the cost of injury litigation goes to
compensate claimants," attributing this statement to Professor Jeffrey
O'Connell.7 The figure is not even close to being accurate, and Professor
O'Connell says no such thing of which I am aware. O'Connell once stud-
ied where the money paid in insurance premiums goes, and found that
56% goes to the insurance company as overhead and administrative costs
and 44% to compensate victims.7' In that article, he mentions a figure of15% as representing one of three kinds of payments to victims, but not as
the total compensation, and not as a percentage of the costs of litiga-
tion. 2 According to a RAND Institute study, plaintiffs in tort cases re-
62. Id. at 42-44.
63. Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 6-7
(1986).
64. OLSON, supra note 4, at 9.
65. Id. at 57-66.
66. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
67. OLSON, supra note 4, at 57.
68. Galanter, supra note 63, at 7.
69. Id. at 16.
70. OLSON, supra note 4, at 10. Olson fails to provide a citation to any of O'Connell's
published works to support this claim.
71. Jeffrey O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault
Insurance for Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. REV. 501, 504-06 (1976).
72. Id. at 507.
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ceive an average of 70% of damage awards; their legal fees and expenses
amount to only 30% of damage awards.7
Olson also makes inaccurate statements about the law. As one basis
for his criticism of long-arm jurisdiction, Olson states that "[tihe right
. . . to be sued . . . at home was . . . a full-fledged constitutional right,
one that has never been rolled back by any constitutional amendment.
7 7
The Constitution, of course, says no such thing. Article III provides for
diversity jurisdiction but says nothing about in whose home state the suit
Table 2
Estimated Litigation Rates, United States
Jurisdiction
Virginia
Massachusetts
St. Louis
St. Louis
St. Louis
St. Louis
St. Louis
Menard Co., IL
St. Louis
St. Louis
St. Louis
Alameda Co., CA
St. Louis
Alameda Co, CA
St. Louis
St. Louis
St. Louis
Alameda Co., CA
St. Louis
St. Louis
Alameda Co., CA
St. Louis
St. Louis
Alameda Co., CA
Estimated Number of
Civil Cases Per
Thousand Population
240.0
110.0
31.3
28.3
35.9
13.9
10.5
16.4
10.5
7.3
6.9
7.6
7.7
13.5
9.1
14.9
12.5
10.8
12.4
12.8
9.5
16.0
16.9
11.0
FOR CIVIL JUSTICE,
Years
1639
1683
1820s
1830s
1840s
1850s
1860s
1870s
1880s
1890s
1900s
1910s
1920s
1930s
1940s
1950s
1960s
Since 1970
73. JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, THE RAND INSTITUTE
COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION at x-xii (1986).
74. OLSON, supra note 4, at 73.
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shall be litigated. The only statements made in the Constitution about
venue provide that proper venue (in criminal cases) shall be in the state
where the injury occurred.7 5
Olson attacks notice pleading by asserting that defendants do not
know why they are being sued and cannot find out.7 6 Again, this is a ridic-
ulous allegation. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) provides that "[i]f
a pleading . . . is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonablybe required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a
more definite statement" before it even has to file an answer. If the plain-
tiff fails to supply a more definite statement "within 10 days, . . . the
court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed."
Olson also plays the old Joe McCarthy insinuation game, reporting
accusations as if they were truth. For example, he reports that a personal
injury law firm was indicted for bribery and manufacturing evidence. He
then quotes the U.S. attorney who details the charges as if they had al-
ready been proved: "They [the lawyers] produced an eyewitness to two
automobile accidents .. . [who] was never at either accident . . .
How horrible-lawyers manufacturing evidence! However, these are just
charges; no one has proved there is a shred of truth to them. Buried awayin the notes at the back of the book, Olson admits that at the time the
book went to press, the trial to determine whether any of these charges
were true "began in November 1990 and was expected to last several
months.178
Many of the emotional anecdotes used to illustrate Olson's book are
taken out of context and distorted. One of his most powerful illustrations
of the supposed evils of tort law is the case of the poor widow, ninety-
two-year-old Luella Wilson. Olson asserts that a 1989 Vermont case "pro-
voked something of a public outcry" when Luella Wilson almost lost herhouse when a jury returned a huge verdict against her; her only offensehad been "to lend her great-nephew the money to buy a car that he later
crashed."7 9 Olson fails to point out that Wilson bought her nephew a car
to drive knowing that he had no operator's license, had failed the driving
test several times, and had drug and alcohol abuse problems.8 0 He also
fails to point out that the "ninety-two-year-old Vermont widow" was a
millionaire, that the decision holding her primarily liable for the accident
75. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("such Trial shall be held in the State where the saidCrimes shall have been committed"); U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed").
76. OL SON, supra note 4, at 89-91.
77. Id. at 33.
78. Id. at 353.
79. Id. at 70.
80. Vince v. Wilson, 561 A.2d 103 (Vt. 1989).
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was reversed, that her insurance company eventually paid part of a
$300,000 settlement, and that it cost Ms. Wilson nothing.8 '
Another example is Olson's use of a Harvard study of medical mal-
practice. Throughout the book, Olson constantly harps on the huge num-
bers of innocent physicians who are being wrongly sued for malpractice.
82
He supports this position with the claim that a Harvard study of New
York hospitals showed that 80% of lawsuits filed against doctors were
proven to be unfounded. The claim is dubious,8 4 and Olson fails to men-
tion that the primary finding of the study was that most victims of mal-
practice never bring suits at all. According to a UPI wire service summary
of the report, fewer than one in ten legitimate victims of medical negli-
gence ever file suit.8 5
If Olson's illustrations are not distorted and taken out of context,
they often are not representative of the usual lawsuit. The most obvious
example of this is his constant use of isolated sensational big-money cases
as anecdotes. For example, Olson asserts that discovery depositions are a
big burden, often comprising thousands of pages, twenty days, and multi-
ple lawyers.8 6 Although this undoubtedly happens occasionally in the
multi-million dollar lawsuits, it is a far cry from the ordinary case. A 1974
study of Oregon lawyers revealed that in the average case, lawyers spent
$368 to take two short depositions.8 7 The Civil Litigation Research Pro-
ject revealed that lawyers spend a total of only five hours in the discovery
process in the average case. 88
Olson's assertions about lawyers' income similarly distort the true
picture. Olson cites a case in which lawyers billed for 97,000 hours of
work, 9 as if this were routine. According to the Civil Litigation Research
Project, the median time lawyers spend on cases is 30.4 hours; in the
overwhelming majority of cases, lawyers invest eighty hours or less, and
81. Settlement Ends Negligence Suit: Woman Won't Lose Home Because of Relative's
Wreck, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Feb. 21, 1990, at C5.
82. See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 4, at 15-16.
83. Id. at 6.
84. In the majority of cases, a settlement is reached, plaintiffs receive compensation,
and doctors do not contest negligence. If the complaint goes to trial, plaintiffs win verdicts
in as many as 49% of cases. 3A JURY VERDICT RESEARCH, PERSONAL INJURY VALUATION
HANDBOOKS. DOCTOR'S MALPRACTICE 1 (release no. 4.41.1, 1987).
85. Study Shows 10 Times More Medical Malpractice Than Lawsuits, UPI, Jan. 29,
1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
86. OLSON, supra note 4, at 115-16.
87. F.R. Lacy, Discovery Costs in State Court Litigation, 57 OR. L. REv. 289, 297
(1978).
88. Trubek et al., supra note 1, at 90-91 (noting that the median time spent was 30.4
hours per case, with 16.7% of attorney time spent in discovery).
89. OLSON, supra note 4, at 250-54.
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no lawyer reported billing more than 2200 hours.90 Olson reports that
"two dozen elite lawyers. . took home $4 million or more apiece in 1988
. . .[and one] bagged an estimated $450 million," and that even begin-
ning lawyers in New York earn over $80,000!"I The Civil Litigation Re-
search Project showed that this is a far cry from the real picture. The
median income for all lawyers in 1983 was a modest $45,000. Only 5% of
all lawyers earned in excess of $100,000 a year." Fees in individual cases
do not routinely run into the millions, as Olson suggests, but are usually
under $5,000. In almost half of all cases, the legal fees are under $1,000."
The book also contains numerous ridiculous assertions that are un-
supported by any evidence at all. Olson opines that the litigation explo-
sion is somehow responsible for rending apart relationships between hus-
band and wife, doctor and patient, management and labor, and
businesses and customers.9 4 He asserts that "[h]onest, careful, competent
people now get sued in large numbers, and lose with some frequency."""
He argues that contingent fees stir up litigation, encourage lawyers to
cheat, and make lawyers rich; whereas hourly rates do not." And my per-
sonal favorite:
Visiting European lawyers are often dumbfounded to learn that in
this country most experts are recruited, sent into courtroom battle, and
paid by the contending litigants themselves. Credentials are nice, but
partisan reliability usually has to come first. . . . Frequently the lawyer
writes the testimony for the expert to deliver on the stand. 7
90. Trubek et al., supra note 1, at 91.
91. OLSON, supra note 4, at 9-10. See also id. at 45 (reporting additional cases of law-
yers earning millions).
92. Trubek et al., supra note 1, at 93.
93. Id. at 92.
94. OLSON, supra note 4, at 2.
95. Id. at 9.
96. Id. at 39-40. Presumably, he thinks that hourly-rate lawyers have no interest indrumming up business, but prefer to starve. The implicit claim that there is a major differ-
ence between hourly rates and percentage contingency fees in terms of income is not sup-portable. According to the RAND Institute for Civil Justice, in the average tort case, theplaintiff's attorney on a contingent fee makes about $5000 per case; the defense attorney on
an hourly rate makes about $4000. KAKALIK & PACE, supra note 73, at xi. According to the
Civil Litigation Research Project, the average case occupies 30-72 hours. At a conservative
rate of compensation of $100 per hour, that means a plaintiff's lawyer paid by the hour
would get $3000-$7000 per case. DAVID M. TRUBEK ET AL., PART A, CIVIL LITIGATION RE-
SEARCH PROJECT, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN S-24 (1983).
97. OLSON, supra note 4, at 157. None of the leading works on trial tactics supports his
suggestion. See, e.g., ROBERT KEETON, TRIAL TACTICS AND METHODS 320 (2d ed. 1973); ROB-
ERT MCCULLOUGH & JAMES UNDERWOOD, CIVIL TRIAL MANUAL 393-96 (2d ed. 1980); J. ALEX-
ANDER TANFORD, THE TRIAL PROCESS: LAW, TACTICS AND ETHICS 440-42 (1983).
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This book reads as if Olson is an angry man with a specific axe to
grind. He set out to write a great, conservative expos6 of the evil litigation
system and was willing to let nothing stand in his way-especially not the
truth. He has consistently chosen the most outrageous, non-representa-
tive cases to discuss. When he couldn't find one, he took half-truths out
of context. If he couldn't even find that, he simply made things up.
If Olson had been a little more even-handed and a little less shrill, if
he had acknowledged that the problems of our court system are deep and
complex, and if he had taken more time to separate fact from fantasy,
then he might have succeeded. Olson probably has a contribution to make
to the dialogue about judicial reform, but his constructive criticisms are
lost amid fear-mongering, name-calling, and McCarthyist rhetoric about
the evils of lawyers.
In his rush to make lawyers the scapegoats, he ignores the fact that
the litigation system society vilifies is a system of its own creation. It is
not lawyers who award the million dollar verdicts Olson criticizes, it is
people like Olson himself sitting on juries. It is not greedy plaintiffs' at-
torneys who are responsible for the million-dollar settlements Olson criti-
cizes, it is the defendants themselves who offer and accept them. He
seems unable to grasp the simple truth stated by Pogo, "We have met the
enemy and it is us."
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